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Spontaneous emergence versus technology management in 
sustainable mobility transitions: Electric bicycles in China 
 
1. Introduction 
͚MaiŶstƌeaŵ͛ eleĐtƌiĐ Đaƌ teĐhŶologǇ has ƌeĐeiǀed ǁidespƌead goǀeƌŶŵeŶtal 
support world-wide in the form of R&D subsidies, investment subsidies for 
production capacity, incentives and preferential treatment to encourage 
purchase and use, and related support for infrastructure developments (Brand 
et al., 2013) as well as much research to understand how consumer acceptance 
can be increased (Kim et al., 2014; Petschnig et al., 2014; Lopes et al., 2014). 
Despite a plethora of interventions, support and experimentation it is 
reasonable to conclude that the prevailing automobility paradigm remains 
virtually intact (Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Steinhilber et al., 2013). In 
China, oŶ Ϯϴth JuŶe ϮϬϭϮ, the “tate CouŶĐil issued ͚EŶeƌgǇ saǀiŶg aŶd Ŷeǁ 
energy automobile industry development planning (2012-ϮϬϮϬͿ͛ ;“tate CouŶĐil, 
2012). In this plan, energy-saving automobiles are referred to as the vehicles 
with internal-combustion engines as the main power system and having fuel 
consumption superior to the target values for the next stage; while new energy 
automobiles mainly include battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric and fuel cell 
vehicles. The plan aims to promote the development of electric vehicles and 
the transition to a new energy automobile industry. This plan strongly supports 
the development of new energy vehicles rather than electric bicycles or other 
electric two-wheel modes of transport. By the end of 2012 in China, 
government departments had purchased 10,000 new energy vehicles, but only 
a few were purchased as private cars (Zeng, 2013). By contrast, in the same 
year, an estimated 29.3 million electric two-wheelers were purchased by 
consumers to achieve personal mobility (Gunther, 2013). 
 
It is striking that in China the electric two-wheeler market has grown very 
strongly from almost nothing to being a substantial activity in a little over ten 
years (Weinert et al, 2007) without overt policy support. China in 2013 was 
both the largest producer and largest market for electric bicycles and other 
electric two-wheelers in the world (Harrop, 2013), yet this market has received 
none of the attention, protection and suppoƌt giǀeŶ to ͚Ŷeǁ eŶeƌgǇ ǀehiĐles͛ iŶ 
China (Kimble and Wang, 2013); and in some cities the authorities have 
actively sought to discourage the use of (electric) bicycles (Weinert et al, 2007). 
As we show below, government policy has been significant for the electric two-
wheel market, but in different ways. 
 
This paper therefore seeks to address, in an exploratory case study, the urgent 
need to understand how and why the electric two-wheel market has emerged 
in China, and the prospects for learning from the market for applications in 
other countries around the world. That is, the paper seeks to identify 
preliminary causes of the emergence of the electric two-wheel market. 
Drawing on secondary data this paper seeks to chart the development of the 
electric two-wheel market in a policy vacuum. While there has been attempts 
to understand this growth from various perspectives (Weinert et al., 2008), this 
paper links the multi-level perspective of socio-technical transitions from Geels 
(2002; 2005), Kemp and others (Smith et al., 2005; Kemp et al., 2007; Kemp et 
al., 2011) with a multi-scalar framework in order to use transitions theory to 
explain the process of change outside of the traditional reference context of 
technology policy and management. 
 
The paper commences with a short account of socio-technical transition 
pathways and the issue of whether electric two-wheelers constitute an 
emergent niche to challenge the existing mobility regime. Thereafter the paper 
provides a brief outline of the methodological and definitional issues related to 
the study reported here before moving onto an historical account of the shifts 
in pathways that could be attributed to electric two-wheelers in China with 
attention paid to the rapidity of change and its spontaneous character. It is 
concluded that the balance of product advantages and disadvantages has 
provided an historical moment in which electric bicycles have flourished 
despite neglect from traditional policy interventions, but it is rather less certain 
that they are to be understood as an environmental alternative to the car. 
From the standpoint of theory, it is suggested that socio-technical transitions 
thinking has somewhat neglected the contribution of the policy measures 
intended to achieve an impact in one aspect but resulting in changes in 
another aspect. 
 
 
2. Spontaneous emergence or purposive nurture: the perspective 
of multi-scalar transitions theory 
Transitions theory is a way of understanding the permeation of socio-technical 
change across time and space. However, those working with sustainable 
production and consumption frameworks or theories of sustainable transitions 
tend to do so with a distinct policy orientation in which forms of governance 
intervention are anticipated to be fundamental to a successful migration away 
from currently unsustainable practices. The underlying assumption is that 
purposive policy interventions are necessary in order to stimulate and nurture 
new production-consumption modes, resulting in a concern for fiscal and other 
incentives, learning from socio-technical experimentation, consensus building, 
R&D support, infrastructure development, regulatory frameworks and other 
features (Beck et al., 2013; Small, 2012). Processes of change are held to be 
relatively ponderous and subject to much inertia. In contrast, as this paper 
seeks to show, the disruptions to embedded regimes identified by Marsden 
and Docherty (2013) as necessary triggers of socio-technical change have 
indeed occurred in the realm of electric bicycles in China, which offers more 
encouragement for positive change elsewhere. 
 
It is interesting to note that while transitions theory has embedded within it a 
distinctly managerial and governance perspective, some of the initial examples 
used to establish this increasingly prevalent theoretical framework did not 
necessarily display purposive interventionism. Transitions theory emerged as a 
lens through which to explain historical socio-technical change, rather than as 
a policy instrument with which to guide prospective change, though continued 
elaďoƌatioŶ aŶd ƌefiŶeŵeŶt aloŶg ǁith soŵe ͚hǇďƌidisatioŶ͛ ǁith otheƌ 
theoretical perspectives has shifted the focus of this school of thought (Geels, 
2011). Hence, an extended moment of historical and spatial serendipity 
appears to be crucial in allowing technological innovations, entrepreneurial 
guile and consumer bravery to create the basis of a new socio-technical 
regime. The typology from Berkhout et al. (2004) offers a framework in which 
there are four potential transition pathways depending upon the degree of 
planned coordination involved and the extent to which external or internal 
resources are deployed. Spontaneous emergence in their typology is 
uncoordinated (i.e. market-generated) as opposed to a vision-driven centrally 
planned transition that is purposive in character. Geels and Schot (2007) offer 
a more nuanced interpretation of transition pathways in which outcomes are 
Ŷot assuŵed to ďe eitheƌ ͚plaŶŶed͛ oƌ ͚uŶplaŶŶed͛, ďut aƌe ƌatheƌ aŶ eŵeƌgeŶt 
mixture of the two. The Geels and Schot (2007) framework thus identifies six 
possible theoretical pathways arising out of grounded analysis of actual cases 
(P0 to P5 in the list below): Reproduction of the existing regime; the 
transformation pathway undertaken primarily by the regime actors; the de-
alignment and re-alignment pathway triggered by significant landscape level 
changes; the technological substitution pathway in which niches are the main 
vector for change; the reconfiguration pathway in which symbiotic niche and 
regime interactions underwrite the transition process; and a sequence of 
transitions from transformation and reconfiguration to others of the above 
possible pathways.  
 P0. Reproduction process: If there is no external landscape pressure then the 
regime remains dynamically stable and self-reproducing.  
 
P1. Transformation path: If theƌe is ŵodeƌate laŶdsĐape pƌessuƌe ;͚disƌuptiǀe 
ĐhaŶge͛Ϳ at a ŵoŵeŶt ǁheŶ ŶiĐhe-innovations have not yet been sufficiently 
developed, then regime actors will respond by modifying the direction of 
development paths and innovation activities. 
 
P2. De-alignment and re-alignment path: If landscape change is divergent, 
laƌge aŶd suddeŶ ;͚aǀalaŶĐhe ĐhaŶge͛Ϳ theŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶg ƌegiŵe pƌoďleŵs ŵaǇ 
cause regime actors to lose faith. This leads to de-alignment and erosion of the 
regime. If niche-innovations are not sufficiently developed, then there is no 
clear substitute. This creates space for the emergence of multiple niche 
innovations that co-exist and compete for attention and resources. Eventually, 
one niche-innovation becomes dominant, forming the core for re-alignment of 
a new regime. 
 
P3. Technological substitution: If there is much landscape pƌessuƌe ;͚speĐifiĐ 
shoĐk͛, ͚aǀalaŶĐhe ĐhaŶge͛, ͚disƌuptiǀe ĐhaŶge͛Ϳ at a ŵoŵeŶt ǁheŶ ŶiĐhe 
innovations have developed sufficiently, the latter will break through and 
replace the existing regime. 
 
P4. Reconfiguration pathway: Symbiotic innovations, which developed in 
niches, are initially adopted in the regime to solve local problems. They 
subsequently trigger further adjustments in the basic architecture of the 
regime. 
 
P5. If laŶdsĐape pƌessuƌe takes the foƌŵ of ͚disƌuptiǀe ĐhaŶge͛, a seƋueŶĐe of 
transition pathways is likely, beginning with transformation, then leading to 
reconfiguration, and possibly followed by substitution or de-alignment and re-
alignment.  
 
The transitions process occurs over geographic space, but the definitions of 
landscape, regime and niche are ambiguous in practice (Coenen et al., 2012). 
For example, can a city with millions people be considered as a landscape or a 
niche? Furthermore, the operation of the transition process in which a new 
regime is embedded is also one in which the spatial scale changes (Hodson and 
Marvin, 2012). In effect then, transitions theory is multi-scalar with regard to 
transitions pathways as is illustrated in Figure 1. In this view of transitions 
theory each embedded regime system at the macro-scale is comprised of 
numerous sub-systems or constituent elements in micro-scale, and each 
constituent element has its own micro-structure with a self-contained multiple 
perspectives. Hence, at the macro-level, the coupling and de-coupling between 
the sub-systems is seen as the primary mechanism underpinning the transition 
process in the global system. Transition theory applied in this multi-scalar 
manner is especially useful for a large and complicated system like that 
represented by China. While the unitary nation state is often the logical 
empirical forum for analysis, the geo-political structures within the nation state 
can be of great significance. For example, large cities in China have a 
population that rivals or surpasses many nation states, and those cities are 
economically and socially diverse. City and provincial authorities have 
relatively independent policy-making power in certain key areas, notably in 
this case transportation. In combination, however, the cities also serve as 
constituent elements of China from a macro-viewpoint. As we discuss below, 
the transition to electric two-wheelers in China has not been ͚hoŵogeŶeous͛ 
aŶd ͚sǇŶĐhƌoŶous͛. IŶstead it is iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ diffeƌeŶt tƌaŶsitioŶ pƌoĐesses iŶ 
various cities in which outcomes are both uncertain and contested. 
 
Figure 1: Transition theory in a multi scalar framework 
 
  
 
An important question is the extent to which electric two-wheelers, however 
defined, represent an alternative to the existing mobility regime, a substitution 
technology temporarily displacing petrol-engine motorbikes and scooters, or 
an addendum to the range of mobility alternatives. In other words, does the 
rapid and substantial uptake of electric two-wheelers contribute to more 
sustainable mobility, and simultaneously undermine the viability of the existing 
(less sustainable) mobility regime? It is probably too early to answer these 
questions definitively. In the first instance, however, it is necessary to establish 
the scale of the electric two-wheeler market as a transport mode and to 
understand the circumstances under which this market has emerged – as is the 
purpose of this exploratory paper. From the perspective of the established 
mobility regime in China from the 1980s onwards we can define traditional 
bicycles, motorcycles, cars and buses as the primary constituent elements. In 
this respect it could be argued that electric two-wheelers as an emergent niche 
potentially act to displace existing bicycles and motorcycles. While such 
displacement might be disruptive to the supply industries associated with 
bicycles and motorcycles, it is debatable whether electric two-wheelers 
constitute a potentially disruptive niche in the sense understood in transitions 
theory. In mature markets outside China, where two-wheel modes are 
relatively scarce, electric two-wheelers are seen as potential contributors to 
more sustainable mobility (albeit with concerns over safety), but are 
nonetheless part of a wider personal mobility paradigm. 
  
3. Methodology 
The teƌŵ ͚eleĐtƌiĐ tǁo-wheelers͛ (and the more common term of e-bikes) 
conflates several distinct categories of electrically-powered or assisted vehicles 
with two wheels intended to carry one or two people. We in this paper have 
adopted the following categories of two-wheel battery electric vehicles (2W-
BEVs) as illustrated in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Two-wheel battery electric vehicle models 
 
         
(From left to right: e-bike; e-scooter; hybrid model. Source: corporate product 
websites) 
 
 
 i) Electrically-assisted bicycle. There are two sub-types of electrically-assisted 
bicycle. The first is a modified traditional bicycle with pedals, chain drive to the 
rear hub, and possibly gears on the rear wheel. It is a human / electric hybrid 
where the battery and electrical system is imposed on the traditional design, 
and is of low cost. This is a non-advanced hybrid human-electric two-wheel 
bicycle. Moƌe ƌeĐeŶtlǇ has eŵeƌged ǁhat is kŶoǁŶ iŶ Euƌope as a ͚pedeleĐ͛, 
which is a purpose-designed electrically-assisted bicycle with a more 
sophisticated integration of the electrical components, battery and drive 
system, and with increasingly sophisticated software management systems to 
integrate the human power input with the electrical power input. This is an 
advanced hybrid human-electric two-wheel bicycle. These are higher cost and 
typically also heavier (24kg compared with 17kg for the average city bicycle). 
According to the definition given by the General Technical Requirements of 
China, electric bikes are referred to as a special class of bikes which possess the 
following main characteristics:  1) they only have two-wheels, 2) they can be 
driven by manpower, 3) the rechargeable battery serves as the assistance 
power, 4) the maximum speed should not be more than 20 km/h,  5) the 
maximum weight is recommended to be 40 kg, and 6) the width of tyre should 
not be more than 54mm. Hence, electric bikes without pedals are not viewed 
as the standard by the law. However, without licence requirements for 2W-
BEVs, there are many non-standard examples in use. Hence, in the scope of the 
present article is more general than that defined by the General Technical 
Requirements, for example including those with fake pedals. 
 
ii) Electric power low speed bicycle. This is also purpose designed with 
architecture or design frame of bicycles but without pedals at all (or 
sometimes fake pedals). They are designed as low-speed 2W-BEVs, with the 
ancillary components such as brakes not intended to cope with higher speeds. 
 
iii) Electric power scooters and motorcycles. As with the bicycle-derived 
vehicles, these may be either adapted from traditional designs (that used 
internal combustion engines) or purpose-designed as electrics. The vast 
majority to date are of the scooter design, with small wheels and a fairing in 
front of the driver. They are designed for higher speed, easily attaining 50kph 
and are both heavier and more expensive than bicycle-derived designs. 
 
There is, it is worth noting, an emergent 3W-BEV category, just as the 
tƌaditioŶal ͚tuk-tuk͛ is deƌiǀed fƌoŵ sĐooteƌs ǁith sŵall tǁo-stroke engines. 
The 2W-BEV sector has been witness to rapid product evolution as quality and 
performance have increased: Though it is difficult to be precise on this point 
theƌe has ďeeŶ soŵe eǀolutioŶ out of the ͚adapted ďiĐǇĐle͛ ĐategoƌǇ or non-
advanced hybrids and into the more sophisticated advanced hybrid ͚pedeleĐ͛ 
and electric scooter categories. In addition there has been a migration away 
from lead-acid batteries into Lithium Ion batteries. 
 
In China the official, but apparently weakly enforced, definition of an electric 
bicycle describes a weight and performance limit (specifically 40kg and 20kph) 
for such machines. 
 
This paper has not sought to evaluate the relative environmental performance 
of 2W-BEVs, though that is clearly an important issue when considering 
sustainable mobility. Initial research by Cherry et al. (2009) and Van Der Kuijp 
et al. (2013) argues that the major concerns are the lead used in the batteries, 
and the question of how the electricity is generated. Further, there are 
concerns as to whether 2W-BEVs substitute for other transport modes (and if 
so, which modes) or offer some degree of additional travel possibilities. Initial 
eǀideŶĐe fƌoŵ Xu et al. ;ϮϬϭϰͿ aƌgues that iŶ the Đase of the ĐitǇ of Xi͛aŶ the 
modes from which 2W-BEVs transferred were buses (38.3%), bicycles (31.4%) 
and walking (16.3%) – though the study also argued that additional trips were 
induced by the 2W-BEVs. Other concerns arise with mixed modes and 
infrastructures, particularly in terms of the deaths and injuries arising from 
2W-BEV use on the roads (where they are vulnerable users) or on dedicated 
bicycle routes or pedestrian paths (where arguably it is the other users that are 
vulnerable) (Feng et al., 2009; Rose, 2012; Yao and Wu, 2012, Bai et al, 2013). 
 
Table 1: Life-cycle analysis of 2W-BEVs and other vehicles in China 
 
 Energy 
Use 
(kWh/100 
pax-km) 
CO2 
(g/pax-
km) 
SO2 
(g/pax-
km) 
PM 
(g/pax-
km) 
CO 
(g/pax-
km) 
HC 
(g/pax-
km) 
NOX 
(g/pax-
km) 
Pb
 
(mg/pax-
km) 
Motorcycle  21-42 64-128 0.04-
0.08 
0.20-
0.40 
6.3-
12.5 
1.13-
2.25 
0.08-
0.15 
16-32 
Bicycle 4.88 4.70 0.01 0.06 0 0 0 0 
Electric 
bicycle 
3.8-9.9 15.6-
40.5 
0.07-
0.17 
0.07-
0.19 
0.007-
0.017 
0.027-
0.064 
0.010-
0.027 
145-420 
 
(Source: Derived from Asian Development Bank, 2009) 
 
Table 1 shows that traditional pedal bicycles are the most environment-
friendly vehicles on all key parameters, but their limited power limits range in 
daily transport. 2W-BEVs produce less CO, PM, and HC emissions compared to 
motorcycles eǀeŶ giǀeŶ ChiŶa͛s eleĐtƌiĐitǇ geŶeƌatioŶ ŵiǆ although the 
emissions of SO2 and lead are higher. Emissions attributable to electricity 
generation are at least outside urban areas (Ji et al., 2012); and 2W-BEVs 
greatly reduce noise pollution. 
 
The paper relies upon secondary sources of data and previously published 
research - but this can be problematic with regard to China. Official data are 
not always comprehensive or reliable. For example, official road traffic deaths 
per annum are put at about 60,000 whereas the World Bank and World Health 
Organisation estimate the figuƌe to ďe Ŷeaƌeƌ ϮϰϬ,ϬϬϬ. IŶ additioŶ, ChiŶa͛s 
apparently monolithic political structure belies a fragmented and hierarchal 
administrative and policy framework in which there are varying degrees and 
kinds of policy latitude (Hasmath and Hsu, 2009; Jeffreys, 2009; Li and Wu, 
2012). Moreover, the enforcement or translation of policy into action may be 
erratic across different jurisdictions and times, and subject to deep cultural 
variations (Liu et al, 2012) despite formal structures (Zhou, 2010; Mu, 2013) 
making understanding of governance a difficult problem (Bo, 2013). Such 
issues are compounded when, as is the case with regard to 2W-BEVs, their 
rapid recent emergence has overtaken any administrative categorisation and 
thus data are not captured and recorded nationally on a consistent basis. The 
paper therefore integrates a range of sources with due allowance for lack of 
coverage, consistency, reliability and the presence of bias. Chinese 2W-BEV 
Industry websites were used as sources on the various technologies used, and 
some of the insights into the changing regulatory regime. Chinese user 
websites and forums also provided insights on such topics, with supplementary 
information derived from online journals in China and Europe. 
 
 
4. China and spontaneous emergence of 2W-BEVs 
This section of the paper provides an historical narrative on the emergence of 
the 2W-BEV market in China from a transitions pathway perspective. Drawing 
on the literature and the available evidence we identify two pathways in the 
2W-BEV transition at the national level over time. These are described at a 
national level as P1, the transformation pathway phase (1980-1999); and P2, 
the de-alignment and re-alignment pathway phase (1999 onwards). The basis 
of these phases and their constituent pathways is discussed below. While 
these pathways are described as fundamentally sequential for analytical 
purposes, the unfolding of such pathways across the diverse space that 
constitutes China inevitably means that such pathways overlap and interact at 
different spatial scales and times. Elaborating this latter point, we provide 
embedded case studies of two cities (Beijing and Fuzhou). Table 2 provides an 
overview of the changes at a household level in terms of vehicle ownership in 
China as a context for the pathways discussion. 
 
Table 2: Ownership of vehicles per 100 urban households, China 1985-2012 
 
Table 2: Ownership of vehicles per 100 urban households, China 1985-2012 
 
Motorcycle Bicycle Private car Moped
a 
1985 NA 152.27 NA NA 
1986 NA 163.45 NA NA 
1987 NA 176.53 NA NA 
1988 NA 177.54 NA NA 
1989 NA 184.68 NA NA 
1990 NA 188.59 NA NA 
1991 NA 185.51 NA NA 
1992 2.80 190.48 NA NA 
1993 3.53 197.16 NA NA 
1994 5.26 192.00 NA NA 
1995 6.29 194.26 NA NA 
1996 7.94 193.23 NA NA 
1997 11.6 179.10 0.19 NA 
1998 13.22 182.05 0.25 NA 
1999 15.12 183.03 0.34 NA 
2000 18.83 162.72 0.51 NA 
2001 20.40 165.42 0.60 NA 
2002 22.19 142.71 0.88 2.72 
2003 24.00 143.55 4.25 1.36 
2004 24.48 140.21 2.18 6.50 
2005 25.00 120.04 3.37 9.54 
2006 25.30 117.57 4.32 12.61 
2007 24.81 NA 6.06 17.50 
2008 21.39 NA 8.83 23.12 
2009 22.40 NA 10.89 25.73 
2010 22.51 NA 13.07 28.37 
2011 20.13 NA 18.58 32.56 
2012 20.27 NA 21.54 34.47 
a
 moped refers to e-bike, e-scooter, and gasoline scooter.  
(Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1984-2013) 
 
 
4.1 The transformation pathway 1980-1999 (P1) 
When the established regime is self-reproducing as described by Geels and 
Schot (2007) it is possible also that niches may start to emerge, but not 
progress further unless landscape changes occur or internal niche 
developments permit of an expanded trajectory. Under pathway P1 a 
transformation may begin to unfold when landscape pressures increase 
moderately, but if the niches are insufficiently developed they will not displace 
elements of the existing regime. The two-wheel mobility niche was occupied 
by traditional bicycles on the one side, and motorbikes on the other, and these 
constituted elements of the dominant mobility regime. In 1978, at the very 
beginning of the China's reform and opening-up policy, the central government 
established the motorcycle industry as a priority to develop the transport 
system. With the strong support from landscape and regime actors, the 
motorcycle industry increased output sharply from 135,400 in 1981 to 
11,534,000 in 2000 (see Chen, 2006) by which time the motorcycle industry 
could be considered as part of the existing mobility regime, and reproducing 
itself along with reinforcing landscape developments (Li and DaCosta, 2013). It 
could be argued that this self-reproduction phase also broadly applied to 
traditional bicycles that remained prevalent during this era although this part 
of the market is not well documented. 
 
The 2W-BEV industry started to develop with niche innovations during the 
1980s. The very first 2W-BEV modes were non-advanced hybrids that 
resembled normal pedal bicycles with a chain-driven rear wheel. The 2W-BEV 
reduced user effort and effectively increased range at relatively modest 
additional cost, and so were accepted by some users. Moreover, in the event 
of battery or motor failure, it was still possible to ride the bicycle on pedal 
power alone. Several small 2W-BEV manufactures were established around the 
Shanghai, Zhejiang and Tianjin areas. In 1988, 40,000 2W-BEVs were produced 
in Shanghai (Yang, 2010). However, these 2W-BEVs used dilute lead-acid 
batteries which had the nature of heavy weight, low battery efficiency and 
liability to leakage, resulting in 2W-BEVs failing to satisfy practical 
requirements (Huang, 1999). Fundamentally, these machines were traditional 
pedal bicycles with batteries and motors added, and hence drew from a 
separate constituency than the mainstream mobility regime actors. In addition, 
some critical technology problems with the motor and control systems 
impeded market development. With limited technology and customer service 
2W-BEVs remained of negligible significance.  
 
 
4.2 De-alignment and re-alignment pathway (1999 onwards) (P2) 
In broad terms the P2 pathway runs from 1999 onwards, although the 
situation started to change around 1995, when some manufacturers produced 
rear-wheel motor electric bicycles with a capability to achieve 20kph, thereby 
beginning to arouse some attention (Huang, 1999). Furthermore, and crucially, 
2W-BEVs were granted permission from central government to travel on roads 
and as such opened a niche market with 54,500 output in 1998, 126,000 
output in 1999, and 276,000 output in 2000 (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Output of motor bicycles and e-bikes from 1997-2000 
 Date 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Motorcycles 10,039,362 8,793,443 11,269,136 11,533,848 
e-bikes --- 54,500 126,000 276,000 
e-
bikes/motorc
ycles 
--- 0.62% 1.11% 2.39% 
(Source: Liu, 2008) 
 
However, generally 2W-BEV development was still blocked by the blooming 
motorcycle industry. Table 3 shows that 2W-BEV output in each year from 
1998 to 2000 was only 0.62 per cent, 1.11 per cent, and 2.39 per cent of 
motorcycle output, respectively. Reinforcing landscape developments helped 
stabilize the motorcycle as a constituent of the prevailing dynamically stable 
regime. This situation was altered when the central government decided 
against further support for the motorcycle industry, thereby marking an 
important moment in terms of de-alignment. 
 
The groundwork for this spontaneous emergence along a re-alignment 
pathway was undertaken in 1999 when a 2W-BEV national standard was 
established by the central government, which for the first time specified the 
speed, weight and power of 2W-BEVs. In the following year, the Department of 
State Traffic Control Buƌeau dƌafted a ͚‘oad TƌaffiĐ “afetǇ Laǁ͛ to alloǁ ϮW-
BEVs to travel on bicycle lanes. In 2004, this law was passed, defining 2W-BEVs 
as a non-motorized vehicle and permitting a 2W-BEV user to use it without a 
dƌiǀeƌ͛s liĐeŶse. The ŶatioŶal staŶdaƌd ďecame the trigger boosting the initial 
(pedal cycle derived) 2W-BEV market. Importantly, the Chinese government 
had set bicycle production as a national priority and established bicycle lanes in 
cities since 1949 and so some minimal but important infrastructure and 
manufacturing provisions were already in place. 
 
Industrial concentration accompanied the process of market expansion and 
the shift to mass production. With low cost, fast speed, personal mobility and 
convenient accessibility, electric two-wheel vehicles further diffused into the 
market, particularly in urban areas. In 2005, the sales of 2W-BEVs exceeded 
that of the gasoline motorcycle in China (see Ruan et al., 2012). After that, the 
electric two-wheel vehicle market continued to expand, with much higher sales 
than that of motorcycles. 
 
Additionally, Ruan et al. (2012) show the motorcycle sales trend is one of 
fluctuation after the imposition motorcycle bans but without a significant 
deĐliŶe. This is ŵaiŶlǇ attƌiďuted to ͚The hoŵe appliaŶĐes goiŶg to the 
ĐouŶtƌǇside plaŶ͛ ďǇ MiŶistƌǇ of FiŶaŶĐe aŶd MiŶistƌǇ of CoŵŵeƌĐe foƌ 
stimulating the sales of household appliances (including motorbikes) in the 
ĐouŶtƌǇ͛s ǀast ƌuƌal aƌeas at pƌiĐes ϭϯ peƌ ĐeŶt loǁeƌ thaŶ those iŶ Đities iŶ 
2008. In most of the cities, however, motorbikes experienced a de-alignment 
process.  
 
In this situation, a flood of companies entered the 2W-BEV market, including 
some famous bicycle companies (Yongjiu, Phoenix) and motorcycle companies 
(Sundiro, Qianjiang Motorcycle). In 2003, more than 1,000 companies sought 
market share, ending up with fierce competition. In order to occupy the 
market, the companies focused on technology innovation, price, and customer 
service. Core technologies (motors, batteries, and controllers) were 
significantly improved. The 2W-BEV industry accelerated its growth, hastening 
marketing expansion. During 2003, the first e-scooter model was developed, 
signifying a substantive technology improvement. Advanced hybrid 2W-BEV 
models became prevalent, because of their lighter weight and low cost (see 
Figure 2). Electric scooters able to carry cargo and / or a passenger, and of 
greater speed, established the dominant designs and provided clear directions 
for further improvement and process innovations. For example, by 2010, only 
16.1 per cent of 2W-BEVs were of non-advanced hybrid designs based on 
traditional bicycles, 26.2 per cent were e-scooters, and 57.7 per cent were 
advanced hybrid models (National Bike Industry Information Centre 2011, cited 
in Ruan et al. 2012, p.449).  
 
Apart from adopting different two-wheel architectures, 2W-BEV manufactures 
also focussed on battery design, since 2W-BEV performance directly relies on 
battery technology. As discussed previously, the very first (non-advanced) 2W-
BEV models used dilute lead-acid battery, which eventually resulted in market 
failure. After that, 2W-BEV models adopted valve-regulated lead-acid (VRLA) 
batteries with the advantages of lower cost and high reliability, which matched 
with the lower income class source of demand. In 2005, more than 95 per cent 
of 2W-BEVs used AGM (absorptive glass mat) VRLA in China, with the rest 
using Li-ion, Ni-MH, or NiCad (Weinert et al., 2007). Growth in disposable 
income from 2000 onwards was probably a factor in demand for greater 
performance, and a willingness to pay for that performance, in terms of 
appearance, the degree of comfort and flexibility. The battery technology 
employed also continued to improve. Many 2W-BEV manufactures started to 
apply Gel (gelified electrolyte) VRLA batteries. In order to achieve 
customization, 2W-BEV retailers may sell frames and batteries separately 
thereby allowing customers to combine a battery with the best-designed 
frame according to their preferences.  
 
From around 2010 onwards the cumulative penetration of 2W-BEVs can be 
said to have contributed to the displacement of other modes in urban areas 
(Xu et al., 2014). China became more international in focus and sensitivity 
while retaining the one party state system, but equally became concerned with 
key environmental problems such as deteriorating air quality in major urban 
areas (He et al., 2013). This latter issue was highlighted during the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing. 
 
These ͚aǀalaŶĐhe ĐhaŶges͛ at the landscape level brought numerous problems 
into the existing motorcycle urban transport regime, especially from the 
ƌegiŵe aĐtoƌs͛ ǀieǁ. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ ϭͿ ŵotoƌĐǇĐles disƌupted tƌaffiĐ aŶd Đaused 
uŶǁaŶted aĐĐideŶts, haŵpeƌiŶg the eŵďƌaĐe of a ͚ŵodeƌŶist͛ autoŵoďile eƌa, 
2) millions of motorcycles produced contributed tailpipe emissions every year, 
leading to creeping environmental deterioration, and 3) motorcycles were 
treated as obstacles in the intensive city construction (Weinert et al, 2007). 
 
Therefore, since 1997, many Chinese cities started to completely ban or 
partially ban motorcycles and scooters (see Table 4). Some cities released a 
limited number of motorcycle licenses every year or even suspended the 
issuance of new motorcycle licenses. Some cities banned motorcycles from 
entering the city centre or major roads in the city. As of 2009, motorcycles and 
scooters were banned or restricted in over 170 cities (Cao and Fan, 2009). 
While these bans did not challenge the core mobility regime premised on the 
private car, they did create an opportunistic space for the spontaneous 
emergence of the 2W-BEV alternative. 
 
Table 4: Cities banning or restricting motorcycles 
 
Provincial level 
cities 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai 
Sub-provincial, 
prefecture-level, 
and 
County-level 
cities 
Guangzhou, Zhongshan, Shaoguan, Zhuhai, Dongguan, Shantou, 
Shenzhen (in Guangdong Province) 
Shenyang, Dandong, Dalian, Tieling, Benxi, Anshan (in Liaoning 
Province) 
Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Nantong, 
Yangzhou, Yancheng, Huai'an, Xuzhou, Taizhou, Changshu,  
Zhangjiagang, Jiangyin, Lianyungang, Kunshan (in Jiangsu 
Province) 
Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, Longyan, Xiamen (in Fujiang 
Province) 
Hangzhou, Wenzhou, Ningbo, Jiaxing, Shaoxing, Yiwu (in 
Zhejiang Province) 
Yantai, Qingdao, Jinan (in Shandong Province) 
Shijiazhuang, Tangshan, Zhangjiakou, Qinhuangdao (in Hebei 
Province) 
Luoyang, Zhengzhou, Xinxiang, Nanyang, Linzhou, Jiaozou, 
Anyang (in Henan Province) 
Harbin (in Heilongjiang Province) 
Guiyang, Anshun, Tongren, Duyun, Zunyi (in Guizhou Province) 
Hefei, Wuhu (in Anhui Province) 
Nanchang, Jiujiang, Jingdezhen, Ganzhou (in Jiangxi Province) 
Changsha, Xiangtan, Yueyang, Zhangjiajie, Hengyang, Binzhou, 
Zhuzhou, Changde, Yongzhou, Huahua(in Hunan Province) 
Chengdu, Mianyang, Deyang, Yibin (in Sichuan Province) 
Kunming, Yuxi, Qujing, Mengzi (in Yunnan Province) 
Haikou (in Hainan Province) 
Nanning (in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region) 
Wuhan, Xiangfan, Yichang, Zhongxiang (in Hubei Province) 
Xian (in Shaanxi Province) 
Taiyuan (in Shanxi Province) 
Baotou, Ordos, Dongsheng, Hohhot (in Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region) 
Changchun (in Jilin Province) 
Yinchuan (in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region) 
Lanzhou (in Gansu Province) 
Urumqi (in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) 
(Source: Adapted from Yang, 2010) 
  
The local motorcycle bans created opportunities for niche activities, including 
for example the growth of 3-wheel vehicles in taxi applications. The primary 
beneficiary, however, appears to have been the 2W-BEV market (Ji et al., 
2012). 
 
Hence the 2W-BEV ͚stoƌǇ͛ aŶd that foƌ tƌaditional motorbikes are closely 
intertwined. This example shows de-alignment of the motorcycle transport 
component of the established mobility regime, because of many landscape 
developments and regime actor views. In parallel, multiple niche markets 
emerged and co-existed after the motorcycle bans were imposed. However, 
electric two-wheel vehicles rapidly became dominant, potentially forming the 
core for re-alignment of a new regime in a process that is currently ongoing. 
 
As suggested above, the 2W-BEV transition has followed pathway P2 (de-
alignment and re-alignment pathway) at national level from about 1999 
onwards. Whether the transition process follows P3 (technological 
substitution) depends on whether the motorcycle is displaced or not. Adopting 
the multi-scale transition perspective, in some south China cities, 2W-BEVs and 
cars appear to be the dominant choices. For example, the 2W-BEV and private 
car ownership rate per 100 households is 34.56 and 37.97 in Nanjing, 
respectively (Nan, 2013). By contrast, in a view of national level, the 2W-BEV 
has not so much displaced motorcycles or other modes, but become additional 
to them. However, there appears to be no strong evidence for technological 
competition between 2W-BEVs and motorcycles; the technology package of 
motorcycles did not fail as such, neither was it abandoned by customers in the 
market. Rather, the bans from government simply excluded them from the 
market. In this regard, the uptake of 2W-BEVs is part of a wider picture of 
increased mobility evident in China and many other countries – although China 
is unique in the extent to which 2W-BEVs have been adopted. 
 
Apart from this, the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and 
the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(4-ŵiŶistƌǇͿ puďlished a ͚NotiĐe of “tƌeŶgtheŶiŶg E-ďike ‘egulatioŶ͛ ƌeƋuiƌiŶg 
provincial governments to strictly follow the 1999 2W-BEV national standard 
and remove all the 2W-BEVs that were not complying with the standard 
criteria in 2011. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued a 
notice to regulate pollution from the lead-acid batteries and the lead recycling 
industry. Furthermore, the new national standard of 2W-BEVs is under 
development. These regime actions make the future for 2W-BEVs uncertain. 
 
In the meantime, an increasing number of manufacturers have invested more 
in 2W-BEV technology, especially lithium battery deployment. For example, the 
estimated output of lithium powered 2W-BEVs grew from 461,540 in 2010 to 
750,000 in 2011 (Wei, 2013). Moreover, on 1
st
 June, 2013, China implemented 
͚E-bike Lithium-ion Battery Specs and Sizes͛, which aims to improve lithium 
battery quality and technology (Wei, 2013). The trend of 2W-BEV 
manufactures is thus to develop and produce higher performance and higher 
value products.  
 
 
5. Two examples at the municipal level: Beijing and Fuzhouo 
The P1 and P2 pathways with respect to 2W-BEVs largely happened at the 
micro-scale, i.e. the cities, rather than the national scale. An example is that of 
the enactment of the local policy on banning 2W-BEVs and then subsequently 
to accepting them. In this, the crucial regime actors are local government and 
local transport management departments. Table 5 shows the treatment of 2W-
BEVs in Beijing, and Fuzhou.  
 
Table 5: City-level policy on 2W-BEVs, Beijing and Fuzhou 2002 to 2010 
 
City Initial E-bike policy Second E-bike policy 
Beijing 08/2002 Complete ban of 
e-bikes on 1
st
, 
Jan, 2006. 
Issued 63,017 
temporary 
licenses (valid 
until 31.12.2005) 
(Duan and Zhang 
2002) 
01/2006 Issue licenses for 
e-bikes and 
permit licensed 
e-bikes to travel 
in the city.  
Issued 235,000 
licenses at the 
end of 2006 
(Duan and Zhang 
2007) 
Fuzhou 06/2003 Ban the sale of e-
bikes. 
04/2010 Issue licenses for 
e-bikes and 
permit licensed 
e-bikes to travel 
in the city. 
 
 
 
5.1 Beijing 
Outside criticism on city policy towards 2W-BEVs firstly came from journalists 
who reported that regime actors (in the form of the city authorities) failed to 
respond to the considered will and travel requirements of the people, with the 
evidence that the penetration of 2W-BEVs in Beijing was 60,000 at the end of 
2001, followed by 36,000 sales in 2002 (Gao, 2002; Fan, 2004; Zhang, 2004). 
Moreover, Beijing News conducted a poll on purchase intentions with respect 
to 2W-BEVs, whose results evidenced that 2.117 million people stated a 
purchase intention in the future (Zhang, 2006). However, the city authorities 
insisted on eradicating 2W-BEVs in the transport system on the grounds that it 
would make traffic management easier and release more urban road space 
that was beneficial for constructing the domestic automobile era. The regime 
actors paid most attention to mainstream automobile industry, for example by 
hosting Beijing International Auto Show, involving the automobile industry in 
the 10
th
 five year plan, and in constructing a new 128km highway (Bai, 2002). 
In August 2002 the Beijing government proposed a complete ban on e-bikes to 
come into force on 1
st
 January 2006. 
 
Since Beijing as a city authority banned motorcycles as well in 1985, citizen 
personal mobility problems were exacerbated with landscape developments. 
Industrialisation, for instance, drew more workers to cities like Beijing, leading 
to accelerated urbanisation, and greater separation of homes from workplaces 
(Zhang et al., 2014). These newcomers could not afford the high living costs in 
central Beijing and thus rented accommodation in the suburban districts: 
thereby extending the commuting distance beyond that which could be 
achieved with bicycles (Zhang et al., 2013). In the meantime, the public 
transport system could not keep pace with demand. Conversely, the low cost 
2W-BEVs which provided for longer travel distance and flexible accessibility 
ǁeŶt ǁell ǁith ĐitizeŶs͛ Ŷeeds (Cherry and Cervero, 2007). Hence, although a 
ban was supposed to be coming into force, 2W-BEV sales continued to grow in 
Beijing after 2002. These 2W-BEV users voiced their concerns through the 
media to increase pressure on the regime. Moreover, academics from social 
science research, city planning and law published many papers to argue against 
the inappropriate 2W-BEV ban policy (Zong, 2002; She, 2002). Besides, 2W-BEV 
manufactures linked up with energy companies and the battery industry to 
strongly oppose the 2W-BEV ban (Zhang, 2006). In response to increased 
pressures, local government and the standing committee of Beijing Municipal 
People͛s CoŶgƌess held a fiƌst puďliĐ legislatiǀe heaƌiŶg to disĐuss the 2W-BEV 
issue on 3
rd
 “epteŵďeƌ, ϮϬϬϰ ;BeijiŶg People͛s Congress, 2004). After the 
legislative hearing, the government still did not lift the 2W-BEV bans. 
 
However, the situation was changed in 2006. During the fourth session of 10
th
 
BeijiŶg People͛s Political Consultative Conference (14th Jan 2006 – 18th Jan 
2006), the delegates pƌoposed ͚the suggestioŶ of adǀoĐatiŶg ƌesouƌĐe saǀiŶg 
and environment friendly transportation tools — e-bikes͛. The delegates 
argued that 2W-BEVs were the very best choice among the available transport 
vehicles, possessing the advantages of affordable price, flexibility, environment 
friendly performance, and labour-saving convenience, which contributed to 
excellent personal mobility (Guo, 2006). In the proposal, there were four main 
suggestions: 1) lift the 2W-BEV bans, 2) issue the 2W-BEV licenses, 3) establish 
clear battery recycling rules, and 4) forbid 2W-BEVs to travel on the motorway. 
This proposal was adopted by Beijing government subsequently. 
 
The penetration of 2W-BEVs in Beijing was an estimated 180,000 at the end of 
2005, which was three times more than that of the penetration in 2001 (Liu, 
2008). By contrast, the penetration of private cars in Beijing was 1.54 million in 
2005 (Rong, 2006) which indicated that 2W-BEVs remained at niche level and 
had not yet been sufficiently developed in Beijing. After Beijing lifted the 2W-
BEV ďaŶ poliĐǇ, a ĐitizeŶ said ͚I ďought aŶ e-bike before. Now that the 
government lifts the e-bike ban, I am going to buy another one for my child. 
His working place is very far away from home. In the past, when I was riding 
the e-bikes, I was always worried about the traffic policeman asking me to pull 
over. I am happy to ride my e-ďikes Ŷoǁ͛ ;quoted in Ma, 2006). Also, the 
manager of the E-bike World Shopping Mall said that the sales increased by 
50% after the lifting of the 2W-BEV ban (Ma, 2006). Because the city 
government altered the strategies on 2W-BEV ban policy, it became possible 
for the penetration of 2W-BEVs to reach 700,000 in Beijing in 2012 (Zhen, 
2012), thereby stimulating the 2W-BEV market as a whole.  
 
5.2 Fuzhou 
An example of the interactive influence on the policy between public and 
government is the transition of 2W-BEV policy in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian 
province. Fuzhou government initially acquiesced to 2W-BEV use, and then 
changed and banned 2W-BEVs, but eventually turned back to accepting them 
in 2010.  
 
The sales of 2W-BEVs initially exploded, by taking the place of motorcycles 
which were banned by the Fuzhou government. With this rapid development, 
2W-BEVs caused some safety and transport management problems. The 
Bureau of Public Security was not prepared for the management of the new 
transport vehicle, so straightforwardly released a ban on 2W-BEVs (Jue, 2001). 
Incensed by this ban, the 2W-BEV user representatives sued the Bureau of 
Public Security for the infringement of public legal right and interest on July 
2001 (Xue, 2001). The case ended up with the success of 2W-BEV users and 
since then 2W-BEVs enjoyed a smooth development period. The sales of 2W-
BEVs increased rapidly, reaching at 100,000 with more than 100 2W-BEV 
retailers. In order to further legalise 2W-BEVs, the deputies proposed to issue 
2W-BEV licenses in the ŶiŶth FujiaŶ People͛s CoŶgƌess CoŶfeƌeŶĐe ;JaŶuaƌǇ, 
2002). Furthermore, a consultation of 2W-BEV issues ĐoŵpƌisiŶg of People͛s 
Congress deputies, traffic policemen, officers of Municipal Transportation, 
journalists, and communities, required the city authority to respect public 
opinions (September, 2002). 
  
However, the Fuzhou government went an opposite way. The government 
held a news release conference on 1
st 
of June 2003 to announce that the sales 
of 2W-BEVs would be banned, due to limited road resources, safety issues, and 
battery recycling issues (Wang, 2003). Not surprisingly, all the 2W-BEV 
companies strongly opposed this policy. 2W-BEV companies sought evidence in 
support of the advantages of 2W-BEVs, and to refute the reasons for 2W-BEV 
bans as declared by the government. The opponents obtained support from 
the people in a wide range of backgrounds, including the Standing Committee 
of the Fujian Provincial Consultative, Committee for Social and Legal Affairs, 
2W-BEV user representatives, and Complaint and Supervision Department of 
Customer Committee. After a few days, 2W-BEV companies sued the Fuzhou 
Industrial and Commercial Bureau for its illegal administrative actions of 
forbidding 2W-BEV sales at a local court (Shu, 2003). 
 
This case gained wide attention and strong support from the mass media, 
scholars, 2W-BEV companies and 2W-BEV users. Journalists conducted in-
depth reports by interviewing officers of Fuzhou government, 2W-BEV retailers 
and 2W-BEV users (Liu, 2003). One academic of the Chinese Academy of 
EŶgiŶeeƌiŶg deĐlaƌed that ͚I aŵ uŶeƋuiǀoĐal to support the e-bike industry to 
enforce the Fuzhou city authority to correct their inappropriate method 
thƌough adŵiŶistƌatiǀe appeal͛ (China Bicycle, 2003). In addition, the 
prosecutors received a generous donation from the 106 e-bike companies (Jia, 
2003). Hoǁeǀeƌ, the Đouƌt ƌejeĐted pƌoseĐutoƌs͛ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts fiŶallǇ (Da, 
2003). 
 
Since that point, 2W-BEV sales were forbidden at Fuzhou. Shortly after, 
however, on the 28
th
 October 2003 another critical moment occurred when 
͚The People͛s ‘epuďliĐ of ChiŶa ‘oad “afetǇ Laǁ͛ ǁas issued ďǇ the “tate 
Council which identified 2W-BEVs as non-motorized vehicles, which provided 
the basis for the legalisation of 2W-BEVs in the range of the whole nation. 
However, according to the law, 2W-BEVs should be registered at the local 
Public Security Bureau in order to travel on roads, leaving some space for local 
government to release restrictive regulations (Transport Safety Law, 2003). The 
Fuzhou government announced that the previous Notice in 2003 was still valid. 
The sales of 2W-BEVs stopped at Fuzhou city. Most of the shops only offered 
customer service (Lin, 2005).   
 
In 2006, with Beijing lifting 2W-BEV bans and issuing 2W-BEV licenses, the 
topic of lifting the 2W-BEV ban again came back into public debate in Fuzhou. 
At the ŶiŶth FujiaŶ PƌoǀiŶĐe People͛s PolitiĐal CoŶsultatiǀe CoŶfeƌeŶĐe ;Ϯϰth, 
January 2007), the suggestion of lifting the 2W-BEV ban was proposed again. In 
the folloǁiŶg Fuzhou People͛s CoŶgƌess CoŶfeƌeŶĐe ;ϭϬth February, 2007), 
some deputies also advocated to lift the 2W-BEV ban, based on the idea that 
the majority of 2W-BEV users had a lower income and the public authorities 
must be concerned over their demands for personal mobility. Moreover, 2W-
BEVs were pƌeseŶted as ͚green͛ products allowing excellent personal mobility, 
while reducing congestion and contributing to improving air quality. Moreover, 
2W-BEVs had by then been permitted to be produced by the State Council. In 
Chinese political hierarchy, the provincial regulations cannot conflict with 
higher level policy. In term of concrete measures, the provincial government 
should facilitate a battery recycling system and establish the standards of 2W-
BEV speed, weight and models. 
 
After the congress conferences, the Fuzhou government started to loosen the 
restriction on 2W-BEVs (Chen, 2007). On the 1
st
 June 2007, 2W-BEVs were 
permitted to travel on two main roads in Fuzhou city centre, and then 
extended to two more main roads on 1
st
 June 2008. Insisting the right of wide 
usage of 2W-BEVs, the 2W-BEV users expressed their opinions on TV, 
newspapers, magazines, community forums, aŶd the ͚e-ďike ďaŶs͛ seminar on 
Internet (Yi, 2009; Dongnan Site, 2010). 
 
With the continuous pressure from public, the Fuzhou government published 
ĐoŶsultatioŶ ǀeƌsioŶ of ͚Fuzhou E-ďike AdŵiŶistƌatiǀe Measuƌes͛ oŶ Ϯϵth 
March, 2010 and held news release conference to explain the law terms and 
the details of the feedback system (Fuzhou Legislative Affairs Office, 2010). The 
͚Fuzhou E-ďike AdŵiŶistƌatiǀe Measuƌes͛ ǁas approved soon thereafter. The 
government further built a speĐial ǁeďsite Đalled ͚“trengthen e-bike 
adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛ which clearly listed permitted e-bike models, and the places for 
registration and getting a license, as well as the information of the latest e-bike 
policies (Fuzhou Government, 2010).  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The paper has highlighted the gap between official policy support for new 
energy vehicles (cars) and the neglect of 2W-BEVs, yet 2W-BEVs are technically 
a very good application for the technology. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence 
to support the view that even the vehicle manufacturers in China can see the 
logic of the 2W-BEV concept compared with battery electric cars (Gong et al., 
2013; Perkowski, 2013). In a sense, the 2W-BEV case in China illustrates what 
Xenias and Whitmarsh (2013) describe as the difference between top-down, 
expert-driven and technocratic solutions, and those that are more emergent, 
local, participant-driven solutions; with the formal system in effect struggling 
to contain, catch, and somehow regulate an activity that refuses to go away. 
This is not deny the significance of state intervention. As noted in this account, 
decisions such as classifying early electric bicycles as fundamentally bicycles 
rather than vehicles meant that licences were not required to operate them; 
while giving permission for these electric bicycles to use the roads opened up 
many potential transport possibilities. In addition, it is probable that 
restrictions on the entry of cars into urban areas, and the shortage of parking 
spaces, were contributory to the attraction of 2W-BEVs in general, while 
banning traditional motorcycles helped create a vacuum in the market. 
 
Hence this paper suggests at least some interesting perspectives on 
transitions. First, that the rapid uptake of a new transport form was not the 
direct result of positive, purposive policy intervention at national or sub-
national government level, nor the result of nurturing nascent niches. There 
was no significant government-sponsored R&D programme in support of the 
2W-BEV market, nor any financial or other incentive offered to consumers to 
encourage the adoption of these vehicles. Faced with the de facto existence of 
these 2W-BEVs, urban governments first reacted negatively, by banning them, 
and then acquiesced to the reality by regulating them. Regulation was itself 
problematic in that there was little understanding of the market (Cherry and 
Cervero, 2007), of user needs and practices, or of the wider integration of 2W-
BEVs into the existing transport milieu (Lin et al., 2008). As such, there may be 
important lessons for the development of lightweight electric cars and 
quadricycles ;oƌ ͚loǁ speed͛ eleĐtƌiĐ ǀehiĐlesͿ that do not fit existing 
definitional categories. Second, this transition process has occurred with 
remarkable rapidity under the particular conditions prevailing within China as 
compared with the historical cases of transitions discussed in the majority of 
the literature. In part this might be due to the transport vacuum caused by the 
outright ban on traditional motorbikes, a policy that less centralised and 
autocratic governments might struggle to enact (Yang, 2010). Third, it could be 
argued that the transition is weakly embedded, however, as illustrated by the 
lack of support or outright antagonism initially shown by government, and 
because the technology itself requires little or no special infrastructure and 
hence has less capacity to generate its own path dependency. The forces 
required to create a strong new mobility regime are not present, while the 
political and economic power of traditional mobility remains substantial. 
Further evidence is needed on mode switching around the use or non-use of 
2W-BEVs and whether such vehicles are stepping stones to the private 
personal mobility embodied in cars. As such 2W-BEVs may help establish a 
behavioural lock-in into mobility patterns that are not readily provided for by 
rapid mass transit for example (Zhang et al., 2014). The rise and partial demise 
of the traditional manual bicycle over the period 1950 to 1990 is somewhat 
testimony to how apparently embedded practices can change with surprising 
speed (Rhoads, 2012; Zhang et al., 2012). Finally, we have shown that 
transitions theory has a greater flexibility and adaptability than previously 
shown in that there are pathways other than those outlined by Geels and 
Schot (2007) that are certainly possible, in time periods that are considerably 
condensed.  
 
In terms of further research there may be potential in exploring further the 
interaction of technologies within distinct spatial areas of governance, 
particularly in terms of diverse cultures of consumption and varieties of 
capitalism. It is intriguing that, anecdotally at least, the markets outside China 
that have most embraced the 2W-BEV are those that use existing pedal 
bicycles as a means of transport (the Netherlands and Germany for example), 
whereas others such as the UK and the USA where the bicycle is a form of 
leisure pursuit have been far less enthusiastic. Alternatively, in the account 
provided here it is notable that the political and institutional system in China is 
able to enact abrupt and comprehensive shifts in policy that might not be so 
readily achievable elsewhere, although it is interesting to note that 
enforcement of policy may be another matter entirely.  
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